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Abstract 
I investigate the market reaction to the events leading up to the passage of the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) using short and long window event studies. Using the 
sample of S&P 1,500 firms, I find positive market reaction to the enactment of the TCJA 
only in one short window; market reaction to other windows remains weak. This study 
documents that firms with high marginal tax rate have positive market reaction only in one 
long window. Further investigation reveals that for the firms with deferred tax assets the 
market reaction is positive only in one short window and in another long window market 
reaction is negative. I also find weak evidence that firms with high deferred tax liabilities 
have a positive market reaction to the passage of the TCJA. In addition, I document that 
firms with high executive compensation record negative market reactions in the short 
windows, but no market reaction in the long windows. I finally find that market reaction to 
the marginal tax rate varies with firm corporate governance only in one short window. 
Overall, my study contributes to the existing tax and accounting literature by examining 
investor reaction to the passage of TCJA based on dominant firm characteristics such as 
marginal tax rates, corporate governance structures, the nature of deferred taxes, and the 
level of executive compensation for events leading to and after the passage of the Act.  
Keywords: Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Event Study, Marginal Tax Rate, Deferred Tax, 
Executive Compensation. 
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1. Introduction    
The primary objective of my thesis is to examine the market reaction to the passage 
of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) using short and long window event studies. 
TCJA, effective since January 1, 2018, is described as the most significant revision of the 
US corporate tax policy since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA-1986) 
(Slemrod, 2018). Two major changes brought by TCJA are1: 1) the shift from the system 
of progressive tax rates to a flat rate of 21 percent and 2) the repeal of the provision of 
performance-based compensation as a taxable expense and the introduction of a limit on 
the total executive compensation tax deduction at $1 million. TCJA is expected to have a 
profound impact on publicly traded companies and consequently a broad range of 
economic repercussions. For example, TCJA is expected to reduce the US tax revenue by 
nearly $1.5 trillion over the next ten years (Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), 2017).  
Examining the effect of the TCJA on stock prices is an important research question 
for several reasons. First, while the frequent changes in laws related to dividend taxes have 
led to the development of a large body of literature that examines whether dividend taxes 
are captured in stock prices (Wagner, Zeckhauser, & Ziegler, 2018), the last major reform 
of US corporate tax dates back to 1986. As a result, it has not been possible for researchers 
to test the effect of major changes in the corporate tax policy on stock returns, despite the 
argument that tax policy has a first-order impact on stock returns (Modigliani & Miller, 
1963). Second, given the significant changes mandated by TCJA, the Bill became law 
                                                          
1In addition, TCJA contains many other changes such as one-time repatriation tax on the undistributed profit retained 
abroad, 100% or full depreciation on the capital assets for five years, reduction in individual tax brackets, repeal of state 
and gift tax, limitation of interest deductibility and indefinite carry forward of net operating losses and mandatory 
capitalization instead of expensing of R&D expenditures. However, these factors demand separate in-depth analyses 
which are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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within three months of the House Ways and Means Committee releasing its framework 
(Wagner et al., 2018; Wagner et al., 2018a). The swiftness with which TCJA turned into 
law makes it an ideal setting to conduct an event study. Finally, because the principal 
purpose of legislating the TCJA is to spur economic growth (JCT, 2017), this study will 
aid policy makers in understanding the perceived effectiveness of major changes in the tax 
policy, particularly as some critics argue that tax cuts do not induce firms to increase their 
real investment (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2019).  
Before the enactment of TCJA, the US had one of the highest statutory tax rates 
among the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) at 38.9 percent (PwC, 2016; OECD, 2016).2 The US adopted a 
progressive tax system with the highest federal statutory tax rate of 35 percent for firms 
with a taxable income exceeding $10 million annually.3 Moreover, US firms are required 
to pay state corporate taxes, which together with federal taxes culminated to one of the 
highest statutory tax rates among developed economies (Lyon & McBride, 2018). After 
the enactment of TCJA, the US statutory tax rate is reduced to 25.8 percent which is now 
slightly above the OECD average of 23.9 percent (excluding the US) (Lyon & McBride, 
2018).  
Prior literature has shown that capital markets react to exogenous changes in the 
regulatory tax policy. For example, Lang and Shackelford (2000) report that stock prices 
move inversely with dividend yield to the announcement of a reduction in the capital gains 
                                                          
2OECD is the association of world major economies and collectively hold 62 percent of global GDP (International 
Monetary Fund, 2018). 
3Firms with a taxable income of $75,001 to $10 million were required to pay tax at a rate of 34 percent. Firms with a 
taxable income above $50,000 but lower than $75,001 fell into the 25 percent tax bracket. The lowest statutory tax rate 
was 15 percent for taxable income not exceeding $50,000. 
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tax rate under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Amromin, Harrison, Liang, and Sharpe 
(2005) document a positive reaction in stock prices to the 2003 dividend tax cuts. Wagner 
et al. (2018, 2018a) find that stock prices of high tax-paying firms react positively to the 
expectation of lower corporate tax rate from Donald J. Trump election victory in 2016. 
Preliminary anecdotal evidence also suggests that the passage of TCJA has been perceived 
positively by the capital markets. For instance, Forbes (2018) attributes the 6 percent 
increase in the S&P 500 index in January 2018 to the TCJA.  
Although I expect an overall positive market reaction to the passage of TCJA, the 
Act contains several provisions that impacts firms in different ways, such as one-time 
repatriation tax on undistributed profit retained abroad, full depreciation on capital assets 
for five years, a limit on interest deductibility, and indefinite carry forward of net operating 
loss. As such, I do not expect a unidirectional movement in the stock prices across these 
firms.  
This study contributes to accounting and tax literatures by providing pre- and post-
enactment evidence on the market reaction to the passage of the TCJA. While prior studies 
document the reaction of the capital market from the US 2016 general election to the end 
of 2017, covering up to the enactment period of the TCJA (Blanchard et al., 2018; Wagner 
et al., 2018), I extend the literature by empirically measuring the capital market reaction 
while the TCJA is being effective. As TCJA is a robust and complex enactment, estimating 
the market reaction while it is being effective would provide policy makers and researchers 
broader understanding of how changes in the corporate tax rates impact investors’ 
perception of TCJA. Second, the literature is largely silent in exploring the moderating 
effect of corporate governance structure on firms’ marginal tax rates. This study will 
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provide investors with the knowledge of how the market responses for firms with 
differential governance structures under the TCJA. Finally, I examine the market reaction 
not only with regard to the varying degree of deferred taxes across firms but also executive 
compensation, whereas Wagner et al. (2018, 2018a) does not consider the executive 
compensation in their study.  
First, I expect firms in a previously higher tax bracket to benefit from the shift from 
a progressive tax policy to a single tax rate of 21 percent because of the likelihood to secure 
greater amount of investable funds from tax savings under the TCJA. By contrast, firms 
previously belonging to the lowest marginal tax bracket may experience a reduced 
undistributed profit because of the higher tax expenses under the TCJA. A lower marginal 
tax rate creates an opportunity for tax savings for firms by reducing the tax payments to 
the government.4 As TCJA reduces the higher marginal tax rates to 21 percent, it increases 
the probability of securing additional cash flows and profits by firms. Therefore, given the 
greater likelihood of creating higher shareholder wealth from tax savings, I predict that 
investors will react positively to the passage of the TCJA for firms previously in a higher 
tax bracket. 
Second, the agency cost of free cash flow that managers being opportunistic would 
like to invest surplus cash flows in projects that have negative net present value to increase 
the resources under their control. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers are interested in 
growing the firm size beyond the optimal level because growth increases the power of 
managers by enabling them to control more resources. According to Jensen (1986) free 
                                                          
4The likelihood of retaining additional cash flows through tax savings is discussed in the tax avoidance literature (Scholes, 
Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, & Shevlin, 2009). 
5 
 
cash flows are the net of cash flows after investing in all positive net present value projects 
when discounted at the firm cost of capital.  
Hart (1995) argues that in the presence of agency costs and incomplete contracts 
between principals (shareholders) and managers (agent), corporate governance may act as 
an instrument to reduce the divergent behavior of managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
also suggest putting in place monitoring devices so that shareholders can reduce the 
opportunistic activities of their managers. In the same vein, I argue that strong corporate 
governance structures may increase the likelihood of creating shareholders’ wealth by 
utilizing the cash flows resulting from the tax cuts under the TCJA. The impact of this tax 
cuts would be more pronounced for firms previously in higher tax bracket. Therefore, I 
predict that in the presence of strong corporate governance the market reaction to the 
passage of the TCJA will be more positive for firms previously in higher tax bracket than 
in lower tax bracket. However, firms belonging to lower tax bracket before the passage of 
TCJA might not experience a positive market reaction because TCJA increases the 
marginal tax rate for those firms. 
Third, changes in the marginal tax rates affect firms with deferred taxes differently. 
Deferred taxes arise due to the temporary difference between the GAAP and taxable 
income and divided into two categories: deferred tax assets (DEFTAs) and deferred tax 
liabilities (DEFTLs). DEFTAs indicate reduction in the future tax payable and are treated 
as assets in the balance sheet while DEFTLs refer to the increase in the future tax liabilities 
and are treated as liabilities in the balance sheet.5 As the TCJA reduces the highest marginal 
                                                          
5Examples of DEFTAs includes carryforward of net operating losses, reserve for employee retirement benefits, and 
reserve for possible loan losses. Examples of DEFTLs include undistributed foreign earnings, depreciation differences, 
and installment sales. 
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tax rate to 21 percent, firms lose the future tax benefits from DEFTAs. Preliminary 
anecdotal evidence suggests that firms are affected negatively due to high amounts of 
DEFTAs in their balance sheet (The Economist, 2018; Forbes, 2018). For example, 
Citigroup has $43.2 billion of DEFTAs in its balance sheet (The Economist, 2018) but due 
to the passage of the TCJA, the firm announces that it intends to write off DEFTAs by $22 
billion (Forbes, 2018).  As Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 740 of the Income 
Tax Act requires firms to adjust tax items as per the changes in the tax laws and rates in 
the period the law is enacted, many companies will have to reduce their DEFTAs due to 
the reduction in the corporate marginal tax bracket to 21 percent (Forbes, 2018). 
Conversely, DEFTLs increase the future tax liabilities of a firm by reducing the current 
taxable income with a variety of accounting techniques such as international profits 
retained abroad and accelerated depreciation. Therefore, I predict that the market will react 
more negatively (positively) for firms with high DEFTAs (DEFTLs) to the passage of the 
TCJA. 
Finally, TCJA repeals the provision of tax deductibility of performance-based 
compensation and requires publicly traded corporations to limit the tax deductibility of 
executive compensation per covered employee to $1 million.6 Prior to the enactment of the 
TCJA, publicly traded firms were allowed to deduct all performance-based compensation 
as tax deductible expenses for covered employees under the Section 162(m). The changes 
in the Section 162(m) under TCJA with regard to executive compensation are likely to 
increase the income tax expenses for firms with high compensation for covered employees. 
                                                          
6The definition of covered employees includes CEOs, CFOs, and the next three highest paid employees in a listed 
corporation. Performance-based compensation is defined as the compensation that is contingent on achieving 
predetermined criteria (Balsam & Ryan, 2007). Components of performance-based compensation includes bonuses, 
payments based on long-term incentive plan (LTIPs), stock options, and restricted stocks. 
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In particular, as any executive compensation exceeding $1 million for each covered 
employee is taxable and performance-based compensation are unqualified for tax 
deductibility, firms may have greater tax expenses  for executive compensation under the 
TCJA.  
In particular, most of the large firms in US pay their CEOs compensation which is 
well above $1 million (Larcker &Tayan, 2017). For example, Bout and Wilby (2017) find 
that median compensation for CEOs of S&P 500 firms is above $10 million in 2016. 
Moreover, Larcker and Tayan (2017) argue that many covered executives other than CEO 
also receive compensation exceeding $1 million. In the pay package of CEOs, base salary 
constitutes only 11.3 percent (Tonello, 2017), whereas performance-based compensation 
accounts for a large part of the total compensation (Perry & Jenner, 2001; Balsam, 2002; 
Edmans, Gabaix, & Jenter, 2017). For example,  Edmans et al. (2017) document that in 
2014 performance-based compensation constitutes 83 percent of CEO compensation for 
S&P 500 firms. This indicates that the changes under the TCJA are likely to increase the 
tax expense of executive compensation for firms and therefore, I predict that the market 
reaction is more negative for firms with high total executive compensation.      
To address the main research question whether TCJA is perceived positively by 
investors, I investigate the aggregate market reaction of S&P 1,500 firms to the enactment 
of the TCJA using short and long window event studies. My short and long window events 
cover the entire legislation process of TCJA as well as when the Act is being effective. The 
market reaction is calculated using the Fama-French three factor model. Besides, a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  
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I record positive market reactions to the passage of the TCJA only in one short 
window. Inconsistent with my first hypothesis, I find scant evidence that the market 
reaction is positive to the passage of the TCJA. This study also documents little evidence 
about the hypothesis that the market reaction for firms previously with high marginal tax 
rate (MTR) is positive. Only in one long window firms with high marginal tax rate have 
positive market reaction. Therefore, I find weak support for my prediction that firms 
previously with high MTR are able to create more shareholder wealth than firms with low 
MTR. The market reaction for firms with high DEFTAs is positive only in the one short 
window and in the long window the market response is negative. I document weak support 
for my prediction that firms with high deferred tax liabilities will have more positive 
market response than firms with low deferred tax liabilities. The market reaction for the 
firms with high executive compensation (COMP) is negative in the short windows, whereas 
in the long windows there is no capital market reaction. Finally, conditional on the level of 
corporate governance, the incremental effect of MTR on market reaction is positive only 
in the short window. However, in other windows I find no effect for the interaction between 
corporate governance and  marginal tax rate.  
The remaining of the thesis is organized as follows. Section two describes the 
literature review and the development of testable hypotheses. Section three discusses the 
data and the methodology of the study. Section four analyzes the results and section five 
summarizes and concludes the thesis. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Market reaction to the changes in the regulatory environment 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the reaction of the capital markets to the 
changes in regulatory environment. For example, Jain and Rezaee, (2006) and Zhang 
(2007) measure the market reactions to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). 
Specifically, Zhang (2007) studies the economic consequences of enacting SOX by 
examining the market reactions to the events prior and subsequent to the enactment of the 
Act. She reports that US firms have negative abnormal returns around the legislative events 
of SOX.  She attributes the negative market reactions to the higher compliance costs for 
firms. Conversely, Jain and Rezaee (2006) documents a positive market response to the 
events that signal the likelihood of the passage of the SOX. They attribute this positive 
reaction to the investors’ expectation of greater transparency and accountability from the 
implementation of SOX. Their study also reports that the capital market reacts negatively 
to the events that are ambiguous or signal that the Bill would not be enacted. They posit 
that the reason for negative market returns is due to the expectation that the Bill would not 
be stringent enough to ensure transparency in public corporations (Jain & Rezaee, 2006). 
Karamanou and Nishiotis (2005) and Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and Riedl (2010) study 
the capital market reactions to the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) in Europe. Karamanou and Nishiotis (2005) conduct an event study on the 
voluntary adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS) in Europe. They find that 
firms that declare the adoption of IAS experience a positive abnormal return. Armstrong et 
al. (2010) study the capital market reaction in eighteen European countries to the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). They find that firms with lower pre-
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adoption information quality experience a positive abnormal return because of the 
expectation that IFRS adoption will increase the information quality of firms. The positive 
return in stock prices is more pronounced for banking institutions. Armstrong et al. (2010) 
record a negative abnormal return for countries with a weak enforcement accounting 
regulation. 
Several prior studies focus more on tax regulations. Givoly and Hyan (1992) 
measure how the market reacts to the changes in deferred taxes in response to the passage 
of TRA-1986 during the Regan Administration. They argue that if investors view DEFTLs 
as liabilities, then a reduction in corporate tax rate under TRA-1986 should be reflected in 
the stock prices. Shackelford (2000) measures the market reaction to the changes in the 
capital gains tax laws. He finds that reaction of investors to the enactment of Tax Payer 
Relief Act-1997 is rapid and material. As the US had one of the highest statutory tax rates 
among the OECD countries (PwC, 2016; OECD, 2016) and the TCJA is considered to be 
the most significant revision of the US corporate tax policy since TRA-1986 (Slemrod, 
2018), events leading to and after the passage of the TCJA provide an opportunity to 
examine the investors’ reaction to understand whether TCJA is able to achieve its 
objective- increasing the growth of US economy (JCT, 2017), as opponent of this 
legislation argue that the reduction in corporate tax may not spur the economic growth 
(Bloomberg Businessweek, 2019).   
2.2 Market reaction to the regulatory tax rate reduction 
The traditional view of corporate tax savings suggests that shareholder value is 
maximized due to the transfer of wealth from the government to firms (Scholes et al., 2009; 
Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). As shareholders are the residual claimants of assets, the 
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reduction in the marginal corporate tax rate increases the after-tax claims of shareholders 
by diverting funds from government to firms. Specifically, the surplus in the after-tax profit 
and cash flows can be invested in projects with positive net present value (NPV) or paid to 
shareholders as dividends, either of which increases the shareholder value (Scholes et al., 
2009). Therefore, when corporate tax rate is reduced, return to shareholders increases. As 
TCJA reduces the US corporate marginal tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent, I predict 
a positive market reaction to the enactment of TCJA.  
H1: There is a positive market reaction to the passage of TCJA. 
Moreover, given the reduction in the highest marginal tax rate under TCJA, it is 
expected that cash flows available to firms will be greater for firms previously in a higher 
marginal tax bracket. As a result, firms with greater amount of cash flows from tax cuts 
under TCJA have higher likelihood in increasing shareholder wealth than firms with lower 
amount of cash flows. The process of shareholders’ wealth creation is depicted in Figure 
1.1.  
Figure 1.1: Linkage between the reduction in the marginal tax rate and shareholder value
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          Therefore, I predict a more positive reaction for firms with previously higher 
marginal tax rate because of the likelihood of creating higher shareholders value.  
H2: There is a more positive market reaction to the passage of TCJA for firms 
with previously higher marginal tax rates. 
2.3 Effect of agency conflicts of free cash flow on the market reaction to the regulatory 
tax rate reduction 
Agency theory of free cash flow states that when a firm has excessive free cash 
flows which cannot be utilized by investing in profitable projects, managers have a 
tendency to grow the firm size even if it decreases shareholder wealth (Jensen, 1986). This 
theory argues that managers, being rational utility maximizers, will try to maximize their 
utilities in a transaction rather than maximizing shareholder wealth. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) owners (shareholders) delegate decision making power to managers 
(agents) through contractual agreements. Being separated from management, shareholders 
cannot directly monitor the activities of their agents. This increases the likelihood of 
conflict because self-serving agents may act opportunistically to increase their own benefits 
instead of increasing the wealth of their owners.  
Elaborating on the issue, Jensen (1986) argues that managers are interested in 
growing the firm size beyond the optimal level because growth increases the power of 
managers by enabling them to control more resources. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1994) find that an increase in cash flows increases managers’ opportunistic 
behavior. As reduction in the marginal tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent under the 
TCJA is likely to lead to more free cash flows, managers may invest these funds in projects 
where rate of return is below the cost of capital. 
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In the presence of agency conflict, Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that strong 
monitoring activities, for example, independent auditing, incentive compensation, and 
restrictions of budget can reduce the managerial opportunism and protect the interest of 
shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that corporate governance deals with 
agency conflict in a way so that shareholders get a return on their investment by reducing 
the opportunistic behaviors of managers. According to Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 
(2010) corporate governance is viewed as a set of contracts that  align managerial activities 
with the interest of owners. Conversely, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that 
firms that have weaker corporate governance experience a greater agency conflict. Brush, 
Philip, and Margaretha (2000) also record that weak corporate governance leads to the 
inefficient allocation of free cash flows. 
Specifically, as in the presence of strong corporate governance firms previously 
with higher marginal tax rate are now more likely to secure greater amount of cash flows 
under TCJA than firms previously with lower marginal tax rate, I predict that firms with 
strong governance structure might experience a more positive market reaction than firms 
with weak governance structure.  
H3: There is a more positive market reaction to the passage of TCJA for firms with 
previously higher marginal tax rates if they have strong corporate governance 
structures. 
2.4 Market reaction to the impact on deferred taxes from regulatory tax rate reduction  
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) postulates in Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS-109) that firms are required to recognize the 
temporary differences between book and tax bases. According to SFAS 109 deferred taxes 
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arise due to the differences between the book income and tax income (e.g., difference 
between book depreciation base of an asset and its tax base i.e., the amount at which the 
asset is valued for the purpose of tax by tax authority is different from book treatment) (see 
Appendix) and are divided into two categories: DEFTAs and DEFTLs. DEFTAs refer to 
assets that reduce the future taxable income of firms. It can be described as a situation 
where a firm has paid taxes in advance due to the differences between book income and 
taxable income. These taxes will be returned to firms in the form of tax relief and over- 
payment of taxes. DEFTAs include compensation related expenses such as stock options 
and deferred compensation, warranty expense, and impairment of intangible assets. On the 
other hand, DEFTLs are created when taxable income is lower relative to GAAP income 
and indicate that firms are liable to pay more taxes in future because of the higher book 
income in the current period. Examples of DEFTLs include undistributed foreign earnings, 
depreciation differences, and installment sales. 
Prior literature shows that the association between deferred taxes and future tax 
payments (savings) depends on the timing of the reversal of DEFTAs and DEFTLs. 
Specifically, White et al. (2003) argue that only those components of liabilities that are 
likely to be reversed are associated with future tax payments (savings). Givoly and Hyan 
(1992) study how investors react to the impact of news of reduction in the corporate tax 
rate on the DEFTLs that are related with the future tax payments. They find that the capital 
market reacts positively to the reduction DEFTLs from the regulatory reduction in the 
corporate tax rate. Amir et al. (2001) examine DEFTLs arising from depreciation using the 
valuation model of Feltham and Ohlson (1996). They argue that DEFTLs carry value 
because they indicate the deferral of tax payments for firms. Tang and Firth (2012) study 
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the relationship between book-tax difference and earnings persistence. They divide the 
book and tax differences into normal and abnormal components. According to them 
deferred taxes arising from the difference between accounting rules and tax laws are called 
normal and deferred taxes originating from the manipulation of book and tax income are 
termed as abnormal. They find that large normal book and tax difference originating from 
both regulatory differences and manipulation of earnings lead to low earnings persistence. 
They also document that large normal book and tax differences show strong earnings and 
stock returns relation. Joos, Pratt, and Young (2000) also find that large deferred taxes 
indicate weaker relation between stock returns and earnings.  According to them large book 
and tax differences are indicative of earnings management and as a result, investors has 
lower trust on earnings reported by the firms. Lev and Nissim (2004) examine the 
relationship between tax-book income and stock returns. They document that the ratio of 
tax to book income is highly related to stock prices and can predict future stock returns. 
However, Guenther and Sansing (2000, 2004) and Dotan (2003) suggest that the 
timing of reversal of DEFTAs and DEFTLs does not guarantee that deferred taxes are value 
relevant. According to them components of deferred taxes that are associated with future 
tax payments or benefits are value relevant. In particular, reversal of DEFTLs and DEFTAs 
with no corresponding future tax payments or benefit carry no cash flow implications. Prior 
to the study of Guenther and Sansing (2000, 20004) and Dotan (2003) valuation of deferred 
taxes was done based on the timing of reversal of DEFTLs and DEFTAs (Laux, 2013).   
According to Dotan (2003) components of DEFTLs and DEFTAs can be divided 
into two different groups, depending on the timing of inclusion in GAAP income relative 
to taxable income. When transactions related to expenses or revenues are shown in GAAP 
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income (instalment sales, warranty expense, etc.) prior to the taxable income, DEFTAs or 
DEFTLs are recognized in the balance sheet before the cash flow related to taxes are 
realized (Guenther & Sansing, 2004; Laux, 2013). Thus, DEFTLs and DEFTAs provide 
value relevant information about future tax benefits or payments that are realized when the 
deferred tax accounts of an entity reverses.7  
Second, when transactions are recorded in the taxable income before the GAAP 
income (e.g., differential depreciation rate between book and tax rate, see Appendix), the 
DEFTAs and DEFTLs are reported in the financial statement after the tax related cash flow 
is realized. Consequently, DEFTAs and DEFTLs are not associated with future tax benefits 
or payments of firms and the timing of reversal does not provide value relevant information 
(Dotan, 2003; Guenther & Sansing, 2004; Laux, 2013).  
The shift from progressive tax system to a single tax rate of 21 percent under TCJA 
affects firms with high DEFTAs. An example of DEFTAs is carryforward of past losses. 
To illustrate, Company P incurred net operating loss of $50 million in year 2017. Assuming 
the company belonged to 35 percent tax bracket previously, its DEFTAs would be $17.5 
(35% × $50) million in 2017. As the tax rate changes to 21 percent, the company has to 
reduce its tax savings from net operating loss (DEFTAs) from $17.5 million to $10.5 
million which requires earnings to be reduced by $7 million for the year 2017 as per ASC 
740. As DEFTAs help firms decrease the tax burden, the shift from higher marginal tax 
rate to a flat 21 percent will reduce the advantage of having high DEFTAs in the balance 
sheet. Therefore, I predict that market will react more negatively for firms with high 
DEFTAs. 
                                                          
7Value relevance refers to the ability of accounting information to capture the information that changes the value of a 
firm (Schipper, 1999). 
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H4: There is a more negative (less positive) market reaction to the passage of 
TCJA for firms with high (low) DEFTAs. 
Similarly, the effect of TCJA on DEFTLs is the opposite of DEFTAs because 
reduction in the marginal tax bracket reduces the future tax liabilities of firms. Therefore, 
I posit that firms with high DEFTLs will have a more positive stock reaction. 
H5: There is a more positive (less negative) market reaction to the passage of 
TCJA for firms with high (low) DEFTLs.  
 
2.5 Market reaction to the restriction on the tax deductibility of executive compensation 
Principal assumption of contracting theory is that both managers and shareholders 
are rational utility maximizers. Managers will act in the interest of shareholders as long as 
serving the interest of shareholders serves their interests. This theory suggests that the role 
of accounting information is to reduce the asymmetry of information between the parties 
involved in a contractual agreement (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Given this context, setting 
an optimal compensation may provide incentive for managers to share all relevant 
information with shareholders, reducing the information asymmetry between shareholders 
and managers. Hence, executive compensation is viewed as a way to align the interests of 
managers with shareholders.    
In contrast to the efficient contract theory, the managerial power theory argues that 
executive compensation is not optimal and rather it is the result of managerial influence 
over the board of directors (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that the 
observed high executive compensation cannot be explained by an optimal contract between 
a principal and an agent. They stress that CEOs have the power to extract excess 
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compensation by undermining the optimal contracting model. In particular, the theory 
emphasizes the ability of CEOs to set their own compensation. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) 
argue that the more accurate depiction of the CEO pay processes is that the CEO sets his 
or her own compensation packages. They conduct an extensive review of literature on 
executive compensation and conclude that executive compensation is best explained by the 
managerial power theory because efficient contracting  is not adequate to explain the 
soaring CEO compensation. Even though CEO compensation has been experiencing an 
extremely high growth, there are some constraints that limit the size of the compensation. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) called these constraints as “outrage”, as they are indicative of 
the negative reaction of public to the extremely high managerial compensation. It suggests 
that public perception of high managerial pay package constrains the CEO to increase his 
or her pay package even higher.  
Before the enactment of TCJA, there was a tax incentive for publicly traded 
companies to design compensation contracts through performance-based compensation 
under the Section 162(m) (Balsam & Ryan, 1996). Specifically, as the Section 162(m) 
allowed performance-based compensation as tax deductible expense, firms were able to 
reduce their tax expenses for compensation paid to covered employees by tying executive 
compensation to firm performance. Conversely, I argue that because of the repeal of tax 
deductibility of performance-based compensation under TCJA, firms may have lost the tax 
incentive to tie executive compensation to performance. Firms’ increased tax expenses 
with respect to executive compensation is evident by the estimated collection of additional 
$9.3 billion tax revenue over the next ten years by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from 
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repealing the provision of tax deductibility of performance-based compensation (JCT, 
2017).   
Kastiel and Noked (2018) analyze the proxy statement filed by the US firms for the 
fiscal year 2017. Among others, they calculate the pre- and post-TCJA tax expenses for 
executive compensation for Starbucks. They find that under the TCJA tax expenses for 
executive compensation should be around 266 times higher than pre-TCJA for Starbucks.8 
They claim that this higher tax expenses for executive compensation under TCJA is not 
unique to Starbucks. According to them most of the US firms may get affected from the 
new Section 162(m) under the TCJA. 
Section 162 (m) was first enacted in 1993 by President Bill Clinton to control the 
rapid increase in executive compensation (Businessweek, 2006). However, the unintended 
consequence of Section 162(m) is that it led to even more increase of executive 
compensation (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). Perry and Zenner (2001) suggest that because of 
the provision of tax deductibility, performance-based compensation increased significantly 
contributing to the faster increase of executive compensation. In this regard, Wallace and 
Ferris (2009) argue that the rise in the performance-based executive compensation in the 
post 1993 period significantly undermines the spirit of Section 162(m). Balsam and Ryan 
(1996) record that some firms take advantage of Section 162 (m) by setting the executive 
contract in a way so that they can reduce the overall taxes for the firm and employees. 
TCJA addresses this issue by eliminating the provision of tax deductibility for 
performance-based executive compensation. Therefore, I expect that the market reaction 
                                                          
8Before TCJA tax cost  for executive compensation should be about $154,808, whereas after the TCJA it should be 
around $8,673,918 for Starbucks, which is approximately 266 times the tax cost under pre-TCJA. 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/hidden-tax-cost-executive-compensation/ 
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for firms with high executive compensation will be more negative relative to firms with 
low executive compensation.  
H6: There is a more negative market reaction to the passage of TCJA for firms 
with higher total executive compensation. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Selection of event window 
The rationale for conducting an event study comes from the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH). EMH suggests that stock prices are the unbiased estimate of the change 
in future cash flows that reflect all the relevant information concerning publicly traded 
firms (Fama, 1970). Schwert (1981) argues that if the changes in the regulatory 
environment have implications for the capital market, the effects of regulation changes will 
be impounded into stock prices at the time when such changes are first predicted. He 
suggests that the impact of regulation changes on the capital market can be examined using 
stock returns with event study methods. On the other hand, prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) argues that market may not behave rationally because average investors 
may have limited cognitive ability and time in processing the information available to 
them. As a result, this may lead to a situation where stocks are either under or overpriced 
compare to their efficient market values. Since the TCJA is a robust and complex 
enactment, investors may take longer time to process the information contained in it. 
Therefore, conducting longer window event studies may resolve this problem by 
documenting market reaction when TCJA is being effective for some time.  
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     For example, Cutler (1988) examines the market reaction to the passage of TRA-
1986 using event study techniques. He documents a mixed market reaction to the 
enactment of TRA-1986.  Downs and Tehranian (1988) measure the changes in the 
fundamental value of stocks from the enactment of Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) 
of 1981. They document that capital market is estimated to have lost 6.1 percent in 
fundamental value relative to market from the passage of the ERTA-1981. 
The framework for the TCJA was first released on September 27, 2017 and it was 
turned into law on December 22, 2017, when President Donald Trump signed the Bill. 
Given the scale of changes TCJA mandates, the Bill got passed in both the Houses of 
Congress at an impressive pace (Wagner et al., 2018, 2018a) making it an ideal candidate 
to conduct an event study. 
This study considers four event windows and divides them into two categories –
short and long horizons, over which the market reactions to the passage of TCJA are 
measured. The rationale for examining different time horizons are: 1) markets often take 
time to absorb information (Wagner et al., 2018, 2018a). So, the combination of both long 
and short window studies can capture the market reactions to the events leading to the 
passage of TCJA and the post enactment window and 2) investors’ perception about the 
TCJA may change over time. Therefore, using short and long window horizons is likely to 
capture the change in the reaction, if any, of investors about TCJA over time.    
For the short window event I choose September 27, 2017, when the framework for 
TCJA was first revealed, and I calculate the abnormal returns for 3 days  and 5 days around 
the announcement date (+1,0, and -1) and (-2, 0, and +2). The reason for choosing two 
short windows is that it allows researchers to measure the magnitude of the abnormal stock 
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returns around the event date, and thus provides a measure of the impact of the event on 
the wealth of the shareholders (Kothari & Warner, 2006). In the context of this thesis, the 
two short event windows provide evidence about the effects of the specific event, releasing 
the framework for TCJA on September 27, 2017, on stock prices that help corporate policy 
makers understand how capital market reacts to their policy making steps.  
The two long event windows are from September 27, 2017 to December 31, 2017; 
and September 27, 2017 to June 30, 2018. The reason for selecting June 30 as the end date 
for the long window horizon is somewhat arbitrary. However, it represents six months of 
TCJA being effective and provides a measure of the market reaction about how investors 
perceive TCJA relative to the time when efforts to pass the Act were ongoing in the US 
Congress. In the following table the time horizon of events is described in detailed.  
 
Table 1: Time horizon for short and long events 
Event 
horizon 
September 
27, 2017 
September 
27, 2017 
to 
December 
30, 2017 
September 
27, 2017 
to June 30, 
2018 
Category Short 
window 
Long 
window 
Long 
window 
Description 
of events 
Framework 
for TCJA 
revealed 
From the 
day when 
framework 
for TCJA 
first 
released to 
the end of 
2017 
The day 
when 
framework 
for TCJA 
released to 
six months 
of being 
effective  
 
The long window events not only capture all the relevant changes in stock prices 
leading up to the passage of TCJA but may also be able to measure how investors perceive 
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the changes brought by the Act six months into the Bill being effective. Oler, Harrison, and 
Allen (2008) argue that short run event window studies should be supplemented by long 
run window studies if the event of interest is complicated and less frequent. They suggest 
that investors may react irrationally given the complexities of the event and therefore, the 
short run event window may lead to a wrong evaluation as to the efficiency of the capital 
market. Fama and French (2007) also argue that there are settings where investors may act 
biasedly based on an erroneous set of beliefs making the stock prices less informative. 
Hence, studies based on long window event may provide evidence about the efficiency of 
stock market (Brown & Warner, 1980).   
Confounding events 
As confounding events contaminate the market reaction, I control for events such 
as dividend and earnings announcement, analyst forecast, news of a new product launch, 
and mergers or acquisition in my short event window. Firms associated with these events 
are not considered for empirical analysis. Confounding events are checked using Google 
Advanced Search Option from September 25, 2017 to September 29, 2017. I find 16 firms 
that are affected by confounding events. However, I did not control for confounding events 
in long event horizon.  
This study does not measure the market reaction for each of the legislative effort 
that was made in Congress leading up to the passage of TCJA because with Republicans 
holding majority in both the Houses, it was expected that the Bill would be passed without 
any significant filibustering from the Democrats. However, the long window horizon 
chosen in this study covers all the legislative events that took place in the US Congress to 
the passage of the TCJA. In addition, despite having differences between the versions of 
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the House Republican and Senate Bills, they were similar in principle. For example, both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate proposed the same corporate tax rate, a shift 
towards a territorial tax system and a reduction in the tax rate on the repatriated profit.  
3.2 Measures of market reaction 
Market reaction is measured based on CAPM adjusted returns and Fama-French 
three factor adjusted returns. Theoretically, the principal reason for using adjusted return 
is to eliminate the impact of other variables that distort the effect of the factor of our 
interest. For example, firms with large market capitalization may outperform firms with 
small capitalization. So, adjusting for firm size may provide the actual measures of stock 
returns that result from the passage of TCJA. However, Wagner et al., (2018) argue that 
firm size may itself be affected by the TCJA. Since controlling factors in the Fama-French 
model may themselves be subject to the effect of the TCJA, market reaction using the 
model will be lower than the CAPM (Wagner et al., 2018). Therefore, I use both CAPM 
and Fama-French three factor model to measure the market reaction. 
 
3.2.1 CAPM adjusted return 
The CAPM model measures stock returns with respect to the systematic risk. This 
is also called the single factor market model because it considers only market risk. The 
model is described below: 
𝑅௝,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽௝𝑅௠௧ + 𝜖௝,௧          (1)        
where, 
𝑅௝,௧ = Return of an individual stock j on t day; 
α = Risk free rate of return;  
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𝛽௝ = Movement in the individual stock returns with respect to the market risk; 
𝑅௠௧ = Market return on the day t. 
𝜖௝,௧ = Random variable with an expected value of zero and uncorrelated with 𝑅௠௧. 
To calculate the market beta (βj) for each firm, I use the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression of stock returns above the risk-free rate for each day from July 27, 2016 
to July 26, 2017. In accordance with Wagner et al. (2018, 2018a), the rate of return of the 
one-month T-bill is used as the risk free rate. The abnormal stock returns are calculated for 
each day surrounding short and long window horizons. The CAPM based abnormal return 
is calculated by following formula- 
         𝐴௝௧,஼஺௉ெ =  𝑅௝௧ − ( 𝛼ො + 𝛽መ௝𝑅௠௧)           (2) 
3.2.2 Fama-French three factor model adjusted stock returns 
The second measure Fama-French three factor model (Fama & French, 1993) is 
used to calculate stock returns because Fama and French (1995) argue that market beta (βj) 
as an explanatory variable does not reflect all the risk factors associated with stock returns. 
They propose that risk premium on returns of stock depends on the relative size of the 
company and the ratio between the book and market values of the stock. Their model 
described below controls for firm size and risk associated with high versus low book to 
market ratio. 
𝑅௝௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽௝𝑅௠௧ + 𝑠௝𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ + ℎ௝𝐻𝑀𝐿௧ + 𝜖௝௧        (3) 
The formula used in calculating the abnormal return using the Fama-French three factor 
model is- 
𝐴௝௧,ிி =  𝑅௝௧ − ( 𝛼ො +  𝛽መ௝𝑅௠௧ + ?̂?௝𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ + ℎఫ෡ 𝐻𝑀𝐿௧)      (4) 
          where, 
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 𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ = Difference between average return on large market capitalization portfolios 
and small market capitalization portfolios; 
𝐻𝑀𝐿௧ = Difference between the average return for firms with high book to market 
ratio and average return for firms with low book to market ratio; 
 
3.2.3 Calculation of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for short and long 
event windows   
The average abnormal return (AAR) for short and long event horizons is calculated 
using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with 150 daily returns from trading day t 
= -210 through trading day t = -61, relative to the passage of TCJA with an estimation 
window from July 27, 2016 to July 26, 2017.  The AAR is calculated as a simple cross-
sectional average over the number of firms in the sample (N). In accordance with the prior 
literature (Joos & Leung, 2013) I choose a three-day (t-1 to t+1) and five-day window (t-2 to 
t+2)  for the short window horizon to calculate the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) to measure the degree of the market reaction to the declaration of enacting TCJA. 
There is a 60-day gap between the estimation period and the three-day window event to 
prevent the estimation period from including the information that might have already been 
absorbed in the stock prices.  
The AAR is calculated by the following equation- 
  𝐴𝐴𝑅௧ =
 ∑ ஺ೕ೟ೀసభ
ே
                                (5)         
where, t is defined as the trading days relative to the event date. AAR is calculated 
by dividing the total abnormal returns with the number of firms in the sample (N). The 
CAAR is expected to capture the market’s response to the passage of TCJA. It is calculated 
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by the formula stated below. Over a window of three days (short window) from t-1 to t+1 
relative to the event date of September 27, 2017, the CAAR is-   
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅௧ିଵ,௧ାଵ(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)= ∑ ∑ 𝐴௝௧,஼஺௉ெ௧ାଵ௧ିଵே௝ୀଵ                (6) 
            𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅௧ିଵ,௧ାଵ(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑎 − 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)= ∑ ∑ 𝐴௝௧,ிி௧ାଵ௧ିଵே௝ୀଵ                (7) 
Over a window of five days (short window) from  t-2 to t+2 relative to the event 
date of September 27, 2017, CAAR is- 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅௧ିଶ,௧ାଶ(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)= ∑ ∑ 𝐴௝௧,஼஺௉ெ௧ାଶ௧ିଶே௝ୀଵ                (8) 
            𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅௧ିଶ,௧ାଶ(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑎 − 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)= ∑ ∑ 𝐴௝௧,ிி௧ାଶ௧ିଶே௝ୀଵ                (9) 
CAAR in long event horizon studies is likely to capture the delayed market reaction 
(Kothari & Warner, 1997) and provides information on the change in investors’ perception 
of the event, TCJA, over the period. In this study I consider three long event windows and 
in calculation of CAAR only working days have been taken into consideration. The first 
long event horizon for which CAAR is calculated is from September 27, 2017 to December 
30, 2017.  In that period, I find sixty-four working days. 
       𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅௧଴,   ௧ା଺ଷ(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑) = ∑ ∑ 𝐴௝௧,஼஺௉ெ௧ା଺ଷ௧଴ே௝ୀଵ                (10) 
      𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅௧଴,   ௧ା଺ଷ(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑎 − 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑) = ∑ ∑ 𝐴௝௧,ிி௧ା଺ଷ௧଴ே௝ୀଵ      (11) 
The second long event window is from September 27, 2017 to June 30, 2018 which 
includes one hundred and ninety working days.  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅௧଴,   ௧ାଵ଼ (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑) = ∑ ∑ 𝐴௝௧,஼஺௉ெ௧ାଵ଼ଽ௧଴ே௝ୀଵ          (12)           
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅௧଴,   ௧ାଵ଼ଽ(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑎 − 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑) = ∑ ∑ 𝐴௝௧,ிி௧ାଵ଼௧଴ே௝ୀଵ     (13) 
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3.3 Measure for corporate tax rate 
For marginal tax rate this study employs the model of simulated tax rate proposed by 
Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010). In their paper the authors estimate the marginal tax rate 
(MTR) based on the future taxable income using a non-parametric approach. The database 
for MTR is available in Compustat-Capital IQ. According to Shevlin (1990) MTR for a firm 
is defined as “the changes in the present value of the current cash flow paid to (or recovered 
from) the tax authorities as a result of earning one extra dollar current and expected future 
taxes paid on an additional dollar of taxable income (TI)” (p.51). Prior to TCJA, firms were 
allowed to carryforward and carryback their net operating losses (NOLs) (Graham, 1996). 
Because of this provision in Income Tax Code, the tax implication of income earned today 
is not only limited to current earnings but also past and future taxable income (Graham, 
1996). In addition to NOLs, a firm’s current MTR is also affected by investment tax credit 
because of the prior and subsequent year adjustments in the taxable income (Graham, 
1996). Alternative minimum tax also has a similar impact on MTR. Consequently, MTR is 
a better estimate of corporate tax rate than statutory tax rate. 
     Blouin et al. (2010) use two different equations for taxable income to calculate the 
MTR: i) taxable income before transitory items and ii) taxable income after transitory items. 
Transitory items refer to the special items, extraordinary items and income or loss from 
discontinued operations. Equations for taxable income to calculate the MTR are described 
below.  
“Taxable income before transitory items = EBIT + interest on leases - timing 
differences estimated using deferred tax expense reported on the income statement data / 
maximum statutory tax rate” (Blouin et al., 2010, p-212). 
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“Taxable income = Taxable income before transitory items + pre-tax 
extraordinary items and dis- continued operations/ 1- maximum statutory tax rate + 
special items” (Blouin et al., 2010, p-212). 
For the purpose of this study, I use MTR before interest. As firms employ debt in 
the capital structure to reduce the taxable income, MTR before interest expense will not 
be affected by the tax advantage of debt. 
3.4 Measures of corporate governance  
For the indicator of corporate governance, I use the governance index proposed by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). They divide the governance index into five groups: 
Delay- defined as the tactics to delay the hostile takeovers, Voting- defined as voting rights 
related to shareholders, Protection- defined as the protection of directors and officers 
against liability incurred during working for the firm, Other- it includes other takeover 
defenses and state laws. Each group is represented by number of provisions and in total 
there are 28 provisions. Then governance index is calculated by adding one point for each 
provision that restricts the rights of general shareholders. If GINDEX is ≤ 5, the firms fall 
under Democracy Portfolio (strong corporate governance) whereas, GINDEX ≥ 14 
indicates firms in the Dictatorship portfolio (poor corporate governance). Dividing 
GINDEX in two components would help to understand how firms with better governance 
react relative to the poorly governed firms to the passage of the TCAJ. However, GINDEX 
can be between 1 and 28 based on the points given on the 28 provisions.    
3.5 Measures of DEFTAs and DEFTLs 
Proxies for the DEFTAs and DEFTLs are chosen from Compustat balance sheet 
item- Deferred Tax Assets-Long Term, Deferred Tax Assets-Current, Deferred Tax 
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Liabilities-Long Term and Deferred Tax Liabilities-Current. Because change in the tax rate 
impacts both short term and long term deferred taxes (ASC 740), I select both to compute 
the deferred taxes reported by the firms in the S&P 500. Consistent with the prior literature 
(Laux, 2013) I scale the DEFTAs and DEFTLs by total assets to control for firm size. I 
calculate the median industry (S&P 1500) DEFTAs and DEFTLs to identify firms with 
high or low deferred taxes in their balance sheet.    
3.6 Measures of high-level compensation 
Components of executive compensation are taken from the Execucomp database 
with the item name TDC1. It comprises of base salary and performance-based 
compensation. Performance-based compensation is represented by bonuses, payment 
based on long-term incentive plan (LTIPs), stock options, and restricted stocks. As proxy 
for executive compensation is skewed to the right, I take the natural logarithm of sum of 
compensations (over 1 million for each covered executive) of top five executives. As under 
the TCJA firms are allowed to deduct up to $1 million as taxable expense for each covered 
employee, I take compensation paid above $1 million. 
3.7 Model Specifications 
To examine the determinants of the market reaction to the passage of TCJA and to 
differentiate among the hypotheses discussed above, I employ a cross-sectional regression 
using aggregate CAAR for the two long windows and two short windows. I assume that the 
market reaction to the passage of TCJA is captured by the stock prices (Fama, 1970). To 
examine the determinants of the market reaction I use the following: 
CAAR3,5,64,190 = 𝛽଴ +  𝛽ଵ𝑀𝑇𝑅_𝐵𝐼௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑠௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐿𝑠௜,௧ +
𝛽ସ𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋௜,௧ +  𝛽ହ𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௜,௧ +  𝛽଺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௜,௧ +  𝛽଻𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇௜.௧ + 𝛽଼𝑅𝑂𝐴௜,௧ +
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𝛽ଽ𝑀𝐵௜,௧ +  𝛽ଵ଴𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑂𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑅𝑁𝐷௜,௧ +  𝛽ଵଶ𝑅௠௧ + 𝛽ଵଷ𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ + 𝛽ଵସ𝐻𝑀𝐿௧ 
+ 𝜖௝௧       (14) 
where,  
 
    𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ଷ,ହ,଺ସ,ଵଽ଴ = Cumulative abnormal return for three-day and five-day window for 
short event horizon (September 27, 2017); sixty-four days (from September 27, 2017 to 
December 30, 2017), and hundred ninety days (from September 27, 2017 to June 30, 
2018) respectively;    
   𝑀𝑇𝑅_𝐵𝐼௜,௧ = Marginal Tax Rate at the end of year t for firm I; defined as marginal tax rate 
before interest expense; 
  𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑠௜,௧ = Deferred Tax Assets at the end of the year t for firm i, scaled by total 
assets; 
  𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐿𝑠௜,௧ = Deferred Tax Liabilities at the end of the year t for firm i, scaled by total 
assets; 
  𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 = Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Governance Index;  
  𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௜,௧ = Natural logarithm of sum of compensations (over 1 million for each 
executive) of top five executives; Compustat item name TDC1; 
  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = Natural logarithm of total assets;  
 𝑀𝐵 = Ratio of market to book value; 
 DEBT = Total debt (DLC+DLTT) scaled to total assets (AT). Compustat item of debt in current 
liabilities (DLC) and total long term debt (DLTT); 
 ROA = Income before extraordinary items (IB) scaled by lagged total assets (AT); 
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FOROP = Firms with foreign operations. It is indicated by foreign exchange income(loss); 
FOROP equal to 1, if the firm has foreign exchange income (loss) otherwise 0. Compustat item 
is FCA; 
RND = Research and development expenses scaled by total assets (AT). Compustat item is XRD. 
3.8 Control variables 
Five control variables are used to capture the true effect of the enactment of TCJA 
on stock returns. First, I control for the firm size because large firms are more likely to be 
affected by the reduction in the higher marginal tax rate than small firms. Firm size is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of market value of total assets. Large firms with high 
DEFTAs and DEFTLs have to adjust their tax accounts because of the enactment of TCJA. 
In addition, as the prior literature suggests that executive compensation is correlated with 
firm size (Hallock & Torok, 2010), I introduce market value of equity as a proxy for firm 
size. Second, market to book ratio (MB) is calculated by dividing market capitalization of 
equity with book value. As high MB indicates firms with growth opportunities, I predict 
that firms with higher growth potential will be affected more by the reduction in the highest 
marginal tax rate because it will help them to invest to a greater extent. Finally, following 
the prior literature Dhaliwal, Heitzman, and Li (2003), I include factors in the Fama and 
French (1995) three factor model, Rmt , SMB , and HML , as control variables.      
As discussed in my hypotheses, I predict a positive coefficient for MTR_BI, the 
indicator for firm marginal tax rate, because shifting from a progressive tax system to a 
single corporate tax rate may enable firms to secure additional cash flows. Second, as 
DEFTAs refers to the reduction in the future tax payments by reducing the taxable income 
of firms, I predict a negative coefficient for DEFTAs because firms are likely to experience 
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a reduction in their DEFTAs because of the tax cut. Third, DEFTLs are defined as the tax 
liabilities firms are required to pay in future. I predict a positive coefficient because firms 
are likely to experience a reduction in their tax liability from the enactment of TCJA. 
COMP indicates total executive compensation including base salary and performance-
based compensation. I predict a negative coefficient for firms with high total executive 
compensation because TCJA repeals the provision of tax deductibility for performance-
based compensation and total tax deductibility for executive compensation is limited to $1 
million.   
  As the presence of corporate governance has an effect on the benefits of reduction 
in tax rate, this study tests for a moderating effect between MTR_BI and GINDEX. A 
moderating variable is defined as the variable that affects the strength of relationship 
between a dependent and a predictor variable. In this study, the presence of corporate 
governance moderates the relationship between the effective marginal tax rate (MTR) and 
CAAR. I predict a positive association between firms with strong GINDEX that were 
previously in a higher marginal tax rate because a strong corporate governance structure 
reduces the agency cost allowing shareholders to benefit from the reduction in the tax rate 
under TCJA. I assume that CAAR during the enactment and post enactment periods of 
TCJA will reflect the interaction effects of corporate governance with marginal effective 
tax rate. I use the following ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model to examine the market 
reaction to interaction effects (MTR_GINDEX) between MTR and GINDEX- 
CAAR3,5,64,190  = 𝛽଴ +  𝛽ଵ𝑀𝑇𝑅஻ூ௜,௧(+) + 𝛽ଶ𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑠௜,௧(−) + 𝛽ଷ𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐿𝑠௜,௧(+) +  
𝛽ସ𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋௜,௧(? ) + 𝛽ହ𝑀𝑇𝑅_𝐵𝐼 ∗ 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋௜,௧(−) +𝛽଺𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௜,௧(−) +  𝛽଻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௜,௧ +
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 𝛽଼𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇௜.௧ + 𝛽ଽ𝑅𝑂𝐴௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝑀𝐵௜,௧ +  𝛽ଵଵ𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑂𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଶ𝑅𝑁𝐷௜,௧ +  𝛽ଵଷ𝑅௠௧ +
𝛽ଵସ𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ + 𝛽ଵହ𝐻𝑀𝐿௧ + 𝜖௝௧     (15)            
            where, 
𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 = Moderating effect between marginal tax rate and governance 
index. 
All other variables are as defined as above. 
3.9 Sample firms and data 
To investigate the market reactions to events leading up to the passage of the act, I 
start with companies from the 2017 S&P 1500 index, for which data are available in the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and with financial statement information in 
the COMPUSTAT database. I omitted firms with no returns during the study period. Table 
2 shows the total number of observations used in this study. I choose my sample (S&P 
1500) based on September 27, 2017 because legislative efforts to enact the TCJA was first 
documented on that day. Number of sample firms used in this analysis (674 firms) does 
not reflect the initial sample size (S&P 1500) of 1506. The reason for elimination of 832 
firms are attributed to the unavailability of data in CRSP (52), firms missing in Compustat 
(1), lack of governance (345), and marginal tax rate (4). Besides, non-US firms (50), 
financial firms (315), firms with less than $1 million common equity (43) are also left out, 
and firms with confounding events in the short window (16).      
Table 2: Sample Description  
Sample Derivation n 
S&P 1500 Constituents on September 27, 2017 as listed in COMPUSTAT 1,500 
Less: Insufficient return data to calculate CAAR  (52) 
Less: Observations without financial statement data in Compustat (1) 
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Less: Non-US firms (50) 
Less: Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) (315) 
Less: Assets less than $1 million, or negative common equity (43) 
Less: Missing marginal tax rate data  (4) 
Less: Missing governance data (345) 
Less: Firms with confounding events in the short window (16) 
Final Sample 674 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Univariate analyses  
Table 3 provides summary statistics for 674 firms based on the Fama-French model. 
The mean CAAR in all of the four windows is positive. In window (-1, +1) and window (2, 
+2) mean CAAR is 0.000 and 0.003 respectively. In window (0, +63) and (0, +189) CAAR 
is 0.009 and 0.014 respectively. The mean and median value of MTR_BI (0.327 and 0.339 
respectively) and MTR_AI (0.313 and 0.335 respectively) indicate that sample firms do not 
differ substantially in terms of marginal tax rate. Interquartile range (Q3-Q1) for MTR_BI 
(0.018) and MTR_AI (0.023), an indicator of variability in the data set, also shows that 
marginal tax rate does not vary significantly among the sample firms. Table 3 also shows 
that interquartile range for deferred tax liabilities (DEFTLs) (0.075) is higher than deferred 
tax assets (DEFTAs) (0.041) indicating a greater variation in DEFTLs than DEFTAs. The 
mean and median leverage (DEBT) are 27.3 and 28.0 respectively. The average GINDEX 
is 9.209 and COMP has a mean value of 8.892. The average and median return on assets 
(ROA) are almost similar which are 5.5 percent and 5.2 percent respectively. Firms with 
foreign operations (FOROP) has the mean value of 42.2. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Table 4 shows the market reaction to the passage of the TCJA using the Fama-
French three factor model. CAAR in window (-2, +2) is positive and statistically significant 
at 1 percent. All other CAARs are not statistically significant. This indicates that market 
reaction to the passage of the TCJA is very scant.9 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
In Table 5 (using the Fama-French three factor model) sample firms are partitioned 
based on high and low MTR_BI. The mean CAAR for top and bottom 50 percent of sample 
firms are not statistically significant in any of the event windows. When firms are divided 
into quintile, the top and bottom 20 percent firms have the positive mean (0.028) and 
median (0.027) CAAR in window (0, +63) which are statistically significant at 10 percent 
and 1 percent level respectively. The results in this table suggest that investors’ reaction  
for firms with high marginal tax rate is very little, whereas there is no market reaction for 
firms with low marginal tax rate.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In an untabulated analysis (using the Fama-French three factor model) the sample 
is partitioned by firms with high and low DEFTLs. Median (0.023) and mean (0.042) CAAR 
in  window (0, +189) are statistically significant at 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
for firms with top 50 percent DEFTLs. This result shows very weak support for the 
prediction that firms with high DEFTLs are positively affected from the tax cut under 
TCJA. 
                                                          
9When the regression is run including firms (345) for which only GINDEX is not available, I find that CAAR in window 
(0, +63) and (0,+189) is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent. 
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In an untabulated analysis (using the Fama-French three factor model) the sample 
is partitioned by high and low COMP. Firms with high executive compensation (top 50 
and 20 percent firms) have median and mean negative CAAR in window (-1, +1) 
(significant at 1 percent and 10 percent respectively). CAAR in other windows, however, 
are not statistically significant.  
4.2 Step regression  
Table 6 and Table 7 report the step regression where market reaction is calculated 
using the Fama-French three factor model for the three main tax variables (MTR_BI, 
DEFTAs, and DEFTLs). The principal reason for running step regression is to find out that 
to what extent the main variables of my study are able to explain for market responses. 
Only in window (0, +189), MTR_BI is significant at 5 percent level. DEFTAs have negative 
coefficients in window (0, +189) which is statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
However, when control variables are added, DEFTAs lose its significance. In window  (-2, 
+2) DEFTAs has positive coefficient (significant at 5 percent) which contradicts the 
prediction made in the H4. DEFTLs have positive coefficient (0.442) in window (0, +189) 
in the step regression which is statistically significant at 5 percent level. However, when 
rest of the variables are added in the third step, DEFTLs lose its significance in window (0, 
+189). The variable COMP has negative coefficient in window (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) which 
is statistically significant at 1 percent in in the baseline regression. In long windows COMP 
coefficient has no statistical significance. This indicates that in the long run market does 
not react to the level of compensation paid to the covered executives. The change in the R-
square is the highest in step three for all four windows.10  
                                                          
10When the regression is run including firms (345) for which only GINDEX is not available, statistical significance for 
MTR_BI improves substantially (significant at 1%) in window (0, +63) and (0,+189). 
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[Insert Table 6 and 7 here] 
4.3 Main Regression estimation   
  Table 8 reports the regression results for CAAR with marginal tax rate. Coefficient 
for interaction between MTR_BI*GINDEX is negative as predicted and statistically 
significant (at 5 percent) in window (-2, +2). As higher GINDEX indicates weak 
governance and lower GINDEX stands for strong governance, the negative coefficient 
indicates that conditional on the level of corporate governance, the marginal tax rate has a 
positive effect on CAAR.11 However, MTR_BI*GINDEX is not significant in any other 
windows. This indicates that the role of corporate governance in creating shareholder 
wealth when marginal tax rate is reduced is very limited. Regression coefficients for 
MTR_BI is positive and significant at 10 percent level in window (-1, +1), (0, +63), and (0, 
+189). In window (-2, +2) MTR_BI is significant at 5 percent level. DEFTAs and DEFTLs 
are statistically significant at 5 percent only in window (-2, +2). In window (-1, +1) and (-
2, +2) coefficient for COMP is significant at 5 percent and in all other windows it is 
insignificant. This indicates that in the long horizon firms are not affected by the TCJA 
with respect to the level of compensation paid to their covered employees. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.4 Sensitivity analyses using the CAPM model  
A sensitivity analysis has been conducted using the CAPM model to measure the 
market reaction to the passage of TCJA. The results largely consistent with what I find 
                                                          
11When the regression is run including firms (345) for which only GINDEX is not available, coefficient for MTR_BI has 
a higher statitistical significance in all four windows. However, coefficient for MTR_BI*GINDEX loses its significance 
in window (-2,+2) but in window (0,+63) it has significance of 5%.   
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using the Fama-French three factor model. CAAR in window (-2, +2) is significant at 10 
percent. Similar to the results found in the CAPM model, CAARs in windows (-1, +1), 
(0,+63), and (0, +189) are not statistically significant. A step regression is also run to 
examine the market reaction for the three main tax variables (MTR_BI, DEFTAs, and 
DEFTLs). Only in window (0, +63)  MTR_BI has a positive sign and significant at 5 
percent. However, in the baseline regression MTR_BI loses this significance in window (0, 
+63). DEFTAs in window (0, +63) and (0, +189) are statistically significant at 10 percent 
and 5 percent respectively. DEFTLs have a negative coefficient with statistical significance 
of 1 percent in window (-1, +1).  
The interaction effect between MTR_BI and GINDEX is also tested using the 
CAPM model. Similar to the results found in the CAPM model, the interaction between 
MTR_BI and GINDEX is significant in window (-2, +2) at 5 percent. In window (0, +63), 
MTR_BI*GINDEX is marginally significant at 10 percent. Similarly, COMP coefficient is 
significant at 1 percent in window (-1, +1) and (-2, +2).  
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Changes in the structure of the US marginal tax rates under TCJA are the most 
comprehensive since the enactment of TRA-1986 (Slemrod, 2018). Given the scale of 
change, it is expected that the capital market would price the passage of the TCJA. As 
TCJA contains numerous provisions that affect firms in different ways, I do not predict a 
unidirectional movement in the stock prices. Proponents of TCJA argue that by reducing 
the tax burden, TCJA will allow firms to invest more money in the economy. For example, 
TCJA will reduce the federal tax revenue by around $1.5 trillion over the next ten years 
which will help grow the US economy 0.7 percent higher on average in each year from 
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2018 to 2027 relative to the base line projection by Congressional Budget Office (JCT, 
2017). Opponents of the legislation believe that as long as there is no demand for outputs 
in the market, tax cut will not induce firms to invest in capital assets (Bloomberg 
Businessweek, 2019). Moreover, TCJA does not provide clear directions as to how tax 
revenue deficit will be met from reduction in the marginal tax rate. As capital market is 
deemed to be the litmus test for any legislation targeting the economic firms, I investigate 
the links between TCJA and reaction of investors. More specifically, I contribute to this 
important debate, by empirically examining the link between marginal tax rate, DEFTAs, 
DEFTLs, executive compensation, and the stock market reactions from the day framework 
for TCJA was first revealed by the House Ways and Means Committee through six months 
into the Act being effective. 
Using the S&P 1500 firms from Compustat, I assess the market reaction to the 
passage of the TCJA by examining the market responses to the relevant regulatory events 
in short and long event windows. I document the positive market reaction only in one short 
window; market reaction to other windows is weak. This provides a scant evidence in 
support of my hypothesis that the capital market reacts to the passage of the TCJA. As the 
study records positive market reaction for firms with high marginal tax only in one short 
window, I find little support for my hypothesis that investors’ response is more positive for 
firms previously in higher marginal tax bracket than firms in low marginal tax bracket. 
While firms with deferred tax assets are positively affected in one short window, in the 
long window firms are negatively affected. On the other hand, I find very little evidence 
that firms with deferred tax liabilities benefit from the reduction in marginal tax rate under 
TCJA. Results for interaction effects between marginal tax rates and corporate governance 
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are significant only in short window (-2, +2). Finally, firms with high executive 
compensation are negatively affected in short windows.   
My study is subject to several limitations. First, I did not check for confounding 
events for my long event windows. However, I did control for confounding events in short 
windows. I attempted to check confounding events in long horizon. Unfortunately, nearly 
all of the sample firms are affected by events such as dividend announcement and abnormal 
growth forecast. Second, apart from the factors that I consider in my study, the TCJA 
contains numerous provisions that affect firms in multi-directional ways. For example, 
changes with regard to the undistributed profit retained abroad, debt in the capital structure, 
capitalization of research and development expenditures, reduction in the individual tax 
bracket, and limitation of interest deductibility might influence the measures of my market 
reactions. However, I introduce control variables, for example, firms with foreign income 
(loss), research and development expenditures, and debt to minimize the effect of these 
extraneous factors. Third, the corporate governance index (Gompers et al., 2003) I use is 
an old dataset as it was not updated after 2006. The reason for using Gompers et al., (2003) 
governance index is that I do not have the access to other corporate governance proxies. 
This might also contribute to the insignificance of my results. Finally, as firms are still 
waiting for the Internal Revenue Service guidelines as to the few provisions of the TCJA, 
capital market might not absorb all the information contained in the TCJA within the time 
horizon I studied. Therefore, measuring market reaction may partially reflect the how 
investors actually perceive the passage of the TCJA.  
  There are number of avenues through which this thesis can be extended in future. 
First, a subsample analysis can be performed in accordance with the tax exposure of firms 
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(i.e., who benefitted the most from the TCJA). This analysis may provide us with the 
information about which industry (e.g., manufacturing, technology, and financial) benefits 
or loses from the enactment of the TCJA. Besides, as the reaction of investors is not 
unidirectional under TCJA, sample firms can be grouped based on the firm  characteristics, 
for example, earnings retained in abroad, capitalization of R&D, deferred taxes, and 
executive compensation to capture the reaction of capital markets more accurately. Second, 
I do not examine how the reduction in the marginal tax rate affects tax avoidance because 
it is too early to check for the effect of tax cuts on tax avoidance. Since corporate tax 
reduction does not take place frequently, the enactment of the TCJA provides us a unique 
opportunity to test the impact of tax cuts on tax avoidance. Therefore, in future this thesis 
can be extended by investigating whether reduction in the marginal tax rate reduces the tax 
avoidance activities of firms. Third, as estimation window of this study coincides with the 
President Donald J. Trump election campaign, calculation of abnormal return might be 
biased because market might absorb the information of tax cuts from the election victory 
of Donald J. Trump. Therefore, setting a more unbiased estimation window might provide 
a much better measure of market reaction. Fourth, as proxy used for the corporate 
governance (GINDEX) variable in this study is not updated since 2006, other measures 
such ownership by institutional investors might be used so that a large sample can be 
retained to test the moderating effect between marginal tax and corporate governance. 
Finally, firms with undistributed profit retained abroad are affected under TCJA, effective 
tax rate can be used to as a proxy to control for the firms with high profit holdings outside 
the US. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Using the Fama-French Three Factor Model (n = 674) 
 
Variables Mean S.D. 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile 
CAAR[-1, +1] 0.000 0.022 -0.011 0.001 0.012 
CAAR[-2, +2] 0.003 0.027 -0.011 0.004 0.018 
CAAR[0, +63] 0.009 0.146 -0.078 0.003 0.094 
CAAR[0, +189] 0.014 0.332 -0.176 -0.011 0.168 
MTR_BI 0.327 0.044 0.329 0.339 0.347 
GINDEX 9.209 2.505 7.000 9.000 11.000 
DEFTA 0.050 0.037 0.024 0.043 0.065 
DEFTL 0.073 0.062 0.026 0.054 0.101 
COMP 8.892 1.690 8.417 9.193 9.813 
SIZE 8.514 1.494 7.402 8.364 9.617 
DEBT 0.272 0.162 0.152 0.280 0.375 
ROA 0.055 0.071 0.026 0.052 0.092 
MB 4.780 7.153 1.940 2.939 4.704 
FOROP 0.418 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RND 0.025 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.030 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of data used in this study. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
1 percent and 99 percent. 
 
Variable Definition:  
CAAR[-1,+1]: 
 
CAAR[-2,+2]: 
 
CAAR[0,+63]: 
 
CAAR[0,+189]: 
 
 
MTR_BI: 
DEFTAs: 
DEFTLs: 
SIZE:  
DEBT:  
   ROA:  
MB: 
  
FOROP: 
RND: 
GINDEX: 
COMP:  
Cumulative abnormal return over [-1,+1] around September 27, 2017, when the 
framework for TCJA revealed 
Cumulative abnormal return over [-2,+1] around September 27, 2017, when the 
framework for TCJA revealed 
Cumulative abnormal return over [0,+63], from the day when framework for TCJA 
released to the end of 2017 
Cumulative abnormal return over [0,+189], from the day when framework for 
TCJA released to the six months of being effective 
 
Marginal tax rate before interest deductions (BCG_MTRNOINT) 
Deferred tax assets (TXNDBA) scaled by total assets (AT) 
Deferred tax liabilities (TXNDBL) scaled by total assets (AT) 
Natural logarithm of total assets in million (AT) 
Total debt (DLC+DLTT) scaled to total assets (AT) 
Income before extraordinary items (IB) scaled by lagged total assets (AT) 
Market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO) divided by book value of equity (CEQ) 
1 if there is a reported foreign exchange income(loss) (FCA); and 0 otherwise 
Research and development expenses (XRD) scaled by total assets (AT) 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Governance Index  
Natural logarithm of sum of compensations (over 1 million for each executive) of 
top five executives 
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Table 4: Univariate Tests of Market Reaction to the Passage of TCJ using the Fama-
French three factor model 
 
Variables Mean t value 
CAAR[-1, +1] 0.000 0.53 
CAAR[-2, +2]      0.003*** 3.25 
CAAR[0, +63] 0.009 1.58 
CAAR[0, +189] 0.014 0.13 
 
***, **, and * respectively denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 
Table 5: Univariate Tests of Differences Using the Fama-French three factor model 
(Using before interest MTR) 
 
 Low MTR_BI  (Bottom 50%; n = 337) 
High MTR_BI 
(Top 50%; n = 337) 
Low MTR_BI  
(Bottom 20%; n = 135) 
High MTR_BI 
(Top 20%; n = 134) 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
         
CAAR[-1, +1] 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 
CAAR[-2, +2] 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 
CAAR[0, +63] 0.006 -0.011 0.012 0.008 -0.014 -0.026 0.028* 0.027*** 
CAAR[0, +189] 0.008 -0.015 0.021 -0.010 -0.009 -0.029 0.055 0.010 
GINDEX 9.157 9.000 9.261 9.000 8.911 9.000 9.097 9.000 
DEFTAs 0.050 0.044 0.050 0.040 0.053 0.049 0.052 0.044 
DEFTLs 0.069 0.052 0.076 0.058 0.076 0.054 0.077 0.063 
COMP 8.515 8.947 9.269*** 9.495*** 8.260 8.771 9.424*** 9.668*** 
SIZE 8.103 7.971 8.924*** 8.979*** 7.899 7.935 9.110*** 9.124*** 
DEBT 0.261 0.277 0.284 0.281 0.278 0.297 0.273 0.271 
ROA 0.043 0.044 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.009 0.027 0.064*** 0.060*** 
MB 4.274 2.756 5.286 3.067** 4.171 2.460 5.643 3.293** 
FOROP 0.445 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.455 0.000 
RND 0.031 0.002 0.019*** 0.000* 0.039 0.003 0.021** 0.001 
         
 
***, **, and * denote high tax firms are significantly different from low tax firms respectively at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level.
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Table 6: Step Regression Estimation of CAAR (Using the Fama-French three factor model) for window one and 
two around the events of TCJA (Using before interest MTR) 
 
  CAAR[-1,+1] CAAR[-2,+2] 
Variables Sign Predicted Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
              
MTR_BI + -0.011 -0.582 -0.010 -0.492 0.025 1.046 0.010 0.409 0.008 0.314 0.041 1.377 
DEFTAs -   0.004 0.152 0.027 1.084   0.022 0.749 0.063** 2.033 
DEFTLs +   -0.020 -1.409 -0.024 -1.206   0.021 1.226 -0.021 -0.841 
GINDEX ?     0.000 0.652     0.000 0.164 
COMP -     -0.002*** -3.054     -0.003*** -3.136 
SIZE      0.001 0.713     0.001 1.102 
DEBT      0.000 0.074     -0.005 -0.667 
ROA      -0.008 -0.503     -0.018 -0.887 
MB      0.000 0.002     0.000 0.023 
FOROP      -0.000 -0.081     -0.002 -0.927 
RND      0.028 1.215     -0.011 -0.366 
Constant  0.004 0.647 0.005 0.743 0.007 0.425 0.000 0.028 -0.002 -0.206 -0.005 -0.223 
              
Industry FE  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  
n  674  674  674  674  674  674  
R-square  0.001  0.003  0.179  0.000  0.004  0.196  
              
 
This table presents regression estimates of Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) around different events of TCJA. All variables in 
the table are defined in Table 2. Industry dummies capture industry fixed effects with two-digit SIC code classifications. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. ***, **, and * respectively denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.   
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Table 7: Step Regression Estimation of CAAR (Using the Fama-French three factor model) for window three 
and four around the events of TCJA (Using before interest MTR) 
 
  CAAR[0,+63] CAAR[0,+189] 
Variable Sign Predicted Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
              
MTR_BI + 0.173 1.353 0.187 1.462 0.149 0.955 0.128 0.441 0.102 0.351 0.698** 2.080 
DEFTAs -   -0.196 -1.270 -0.217 -1.340   -0.797** -2.284 -0.407 -1.174 
DEFTLs +   -0.120 -1.299 0.010 0.078   0.442** 2.121 -0.027 -0.097 
GINDEX ?     -0.003 -1.448     -0.003 -0.696 
COMP -     -0.001 -0.242     -0.007 -0.738 
SIZE      -0.008 -1.508     -0.011 -0.884 
DEBT      -0.036 -0.848     -0.122 -1.349 
ROA      0.048 0.457     -0.449** -2.005 
MB      0.000 0.114     0.001 0.609 
FOROP      -0.005 -0.391     0.034 1.290 
RND      -0.241 -1.600     -0.354 -1.098 
Constant  -0.048 -1.130 -0.034 -0.791 0.224** 2.013 -0.027 -0.287 -0.011 -0.115 0.299 1.248 
              
Industry 
FE 
 No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  
n  674  674  674  674  674  674  
R-square  0.003  0.008  0.230  0.000  0.013  0.309  
              
 
This table presents regression estimates of Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) around different events of TCJA. All variables in 
the table are defined in Table 2. Industry dummies capture industry fixed effects with two-digit SIC code classifications. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. ***, **, and * respectively denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.   
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Table 8: Regression Estimation of CAAR (Using the Fama-French three factor Model) around the events of 
TCJA (Using before interest MTR) 
   CAAR[-1,+1] CAAR[-2,+2] CAAR[0,+63] CAAR[0,+189] 
Variables  Sign Predicted Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
           
MTR_BI  + 0.130* 1.717 0.220** 2.365 0.891* 1.833 1.860* 1.781 
MTR_BI*GINDEX  - -0.012 -1.458 -0.020** -2.029 -0.084 -1.611 -0.131 -1.175 
GINDEX  ? 0.004 1.530 0.007** 2.034 0.024 1.412 0.040 1.077 
DEFTAs  - 0.029 1.155 0.066** 2.134 -0.204 -1.262 -0.388 -1.115 
DEFTLs  + -0.025 -1.252 -0.022 -0.906 0.004 0.028 -0.037 -0.134 
COMP  - -0.002*** -3.123 -0.003*** -3.237 -0.001 -0.320 -0.008 -0.794 
SIZE   0.001 0.735 0.001 1.134 -0.008 -1.486 -0.010 -0.867 
DEBT   0.001 0.079 -0.005 -0.661 -0.036 -0.844 -0.122 -1.345 
ROA   -0.010 -0.587 -0.020 -1.006 0.038 0.364 -0.464** -2.071 
MB   -0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.105 0.001 0.603 
FOROP   -0.000 -0.047 -0.002 -0.883 -0.004 -0.354 0.035 1.317 
RND   0.028 1.180 -0.012 -0.416 -0.246 -1.640 -0.364 -1.127 
Constant   -0.027 -0.925 -0.064* -1.769 -0.021 -0.109 -0.085 -0.211 
           
Industry FE   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
n   674  674  674  674  
R-square   0.182  0.202  0.233  0.311  
           
 
This table presents regression estimates of Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) around different events of TCJA. All variables in the 
table are defined in Table 2. Industry dummies capture industry fixed effects with two-digit SIC code classifications. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. ***, **, and * respectively denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
59 
 
Appendix A  
Deferred tax liabilities 
Company ABC purchases a machine at a cost of $4,000 with an economic life of 
4 years and book depreciation method is straight line. 
Table 1: Temporary difference book and tax depreciation 
Year 
end 
Book value 
(Cost – 
accumulated 
depreciation) 
Tax base 
(Cost –tax 
depreciation) 
Temporary 
differences 
1 3,000 2,400 600 
2 2,000 1,200 800 
3 1,000 400 600 
4 0 0 0 
 
When depreciation charged by the tax authority is higher than the book depreciation 
expense in year 1 and 2, the firm takes the tax benefit early because of the greater GAAP 
income relative to tax income. This situation has a positive impact on the cash flow because 
it defers the payment of tax. The situation reverses in years 3 and 4 when tax depreciation 
is less than the book depreciation and the entity has to pay additional taxes to offset the 
prior lower tax payments. The table also shows that accumulated book depreciation and 
accumulated tax depreciation are exactly same at end of the fourth year which is equal to 
$4,000- cost of the asset. Table 2 presents you the amount of deferred tax liability at the 
end of each year. 
Table 2: Creation and liquidation of DEFTLs 
Year 1 2 3 4 
Beginning DTLs $0 $150 $200 $150 
Increase/Decrease in 
a year 
150 50 (50) (150) 
Ending DTLs 150 200 150 0 
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At the end of year 1, the firm has a difference of $600 (tax depreciation - book 
depreciation) and the company has to pay tax on this $600 in the future (in year 3 and 4). 
In this scenario, prudence, the qualitative characteristic of accounting information (SFAC 
8), requires entity to recognize liability to the tune of expected tax payable. Assuming tax 
rate is 25% deferred tax liability in year one is $600× 25% = $150. At the end of the second 
year the firm has a taxable difference of $800 and the DEFTLs are equal to $200 
($800×25%). As the $150 DEFTLs are already recorded in year 1, additional $50 is added 
in the second year. By the end of the third year the entity has a temporary difference of 
$600 and the DTLs are $600× 25% = $150. Therefore, the DEFLTs have to be reduced by 
$50 from $200 to $150. At the end of year four there is no taxable difference because the 
tax base is equal to the book value of the asset which is zero (Table 1). So, the beginning 
balance of DEFTLs $150 has to be reduced to zero by subtracting $150.     
After TCJA 
Suppose the tax rate changes to 20 percent in the second year. Table 3 provides 
the effect of the change in the tax rate on the deferred tax liabilities. 
Table 3: Impact of change in the tax rate of DEFTLs 
Year 1 2 3 4 
Beginning DTLs $0 $150 $160 $120 
Increase/Decrease 
in a year 
150 10 (40) (120) 
Ending DTLs 150 160 120 0 
 
As the tax rate changes from 25 percent to 20 percent in the second year, the 
increase in DEFTLs is only $10 dollar, which is $40 less than that when the tax rate was 
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25 percent. In year 3 beginning DEFTLs are reduced from $200 to $160 due to the 
reduction in tax rate from 25 percent to 20 percent.  
Impact of tax rate change on income statement 
Assuming earnings before tax and depreciation is $10,000 each year for four years. 
Table 4 describes the differences in DEFTLs due to the reduction in the tax rate from 25 
percent to 20 percent. In year 1, DEFTLs are the same because tax rate is 25 percent. 
However, in year 2, tax rate reduces from 25 percent to 20 percent which also reduces the 
DEFTLs from $200 to $160. DTLs $160 is found by decreasing the year 1’s DEFTLs $150 
by $30 ($600×20%) then increasing by $40 ($1800 − $1760). Similar impact is observed 
in the third year as DEFTLs are reduced from $150 to $120. At the end of fourth year the 
temporary difference between GAAP and tax income becomes zero. 
Table 4: Income Statement and DEFTLs 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Earnings 
before tax 
and 
depreciation 
$10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Depreciation 
(book) 
(1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) 
Depreciation 
(tax) 
(1,600) (1,200) (800) (400) 
Taxable 
earnings 
8,400 8,800 9,200 9,600 
GAAP 
earnings 
9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 
Tax expense 
as per tax 
return 
2,100 1,760 1,840 1,920 
DEFTLs at 
25% tax rate 
150 200 150 0 
DTLs at 20% 
tax rate 
150 (120 + 
40) 160* 
120 0 
Tax expense 
as per GAAP 
2,250 1,800 1,800 1,800 
*($600×20%) $120 + $40 = $160  
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Journal entry considering change in the marginal tax rate 
Year 1 
Account Dr. Cr. 
Income 
tax 
expense          
$2,250  
Income 
tax 
payable 
 $2,100 
DEFTLs  $150 
 
Year 2 
For year 2, there are two journal entries. First, due to the reduction in the tax rate 
from 25 percent to 20 percent, the past DEFTLs of $150 have to reduce to $120 and second, 
the DEFTLs arising from the difference between taxable income and GAAP which is $40.   
Account Dr. Cr. 
DEFTLs $30  
Income 
tax 
expense 
 $30 
Income 
tax 
expense          
1,800  
Income 
tax 
payable 
 $1,760 
DTLs  $40 
 
Impact on cash flows from marginal tax rate deduction 
Because of the reduction in the corporate tax rate (from 25 percent to 20 percent), 
the company will be able to have surplus cash flows in terms of tax savings. For example, 
in the second year, the company is required to pay $1,760 as tax expense relative to $2,200 
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($8,800 × 25%) leading to a surplus in cash flows of $440 which are described in Table 5. 
Total surplus cash flows over the three years are $1,380 from the reduction in the corporate 
tax rate.  
Table 5: Cash flow implication from corporate tax reduction 
 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Tax expense as per tax return 
when there is no change in 
the corporate tax rate 
2,200 2,300 2,400 
Tax expense as per tax return 
when tax rate reduces from 
25 percent to 20 percent 
1,760 1,840 1,920 
Surplus cash flows $440 $460 $480 
 
Only impact on deferred taxes is that it reduces the DEFTLs (Table 3). As tax 
depreciation (higher tax depreciation rate relative to GAAP rate) precedes GAAP 
depreciation, the company takes advantage of lower taxable income early of the asset life 
by paying lower amount of tax. When this trend reverses in year 3 and 4, there is no tax 
related tax related cash flows for ABC.  
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Appendix B 
Description of the Variables  
Variable Description Source 
MTR_BI Marginal tax rate is calculated before 
subtracting financing cost from 
taxable income. Taxable income is 
calculated without considering 
transitory items such as special items, 
discontinued operations, and  
extraordinary items COMPUSAT item 
indicator for MTR_BI is 
BCG_MTRINT. 
COMPUSTAT 
DEFTAs Deferred tax assets scaled by total 
assets (AT). COMPUSTAT item name 
is TXNDBA. 
COMPUSTAT 
DEFTLs Deferred tax liabilities scaled by total 
assets (AT). COMPUSTAT item name 
is TXNDBL. 
COMPUSTAT 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets in 
million US dollars. COMPUSTAT 
name is AT. 
COMPUSTAT 
DEBT Total debt scaled to total assets (AT). 
It is calculated by adding 
COMPUSTAT item DLC+DLTT. 
COMPUSTAT 
ROA Income before extraordinary items 
(IB) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
COMPUSTAT 
MB Market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity. Market value of 
equity is calculated by multiplying 
COMPUSTAT item PRCC_F with 
COMPUSTAT 
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CSHO. COMPUSTAT item for book 
value is CEQ. 
 
FOROP Firms with foreign operations. It is 
indicated by foreign exchange 
income(loss). FOROP equal to 1, if 
the firm has foreign exchange income 
(loss) otherwise 0. COMPUSTAT 
item is FCA. 
COMPUSTAT 
RND Research and development expenses 
scaled by total assets (AT). 
COMPUSTAT item is XRD. 
COMPUSTAT 
GINDEX Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
Governance Index. An index for 
variable. If the index is ≤ 5, a firm has 
strong governance      structure. If the 
index is ≥ 14, a firm has poor 
corporate governance 
Website: 
http://faculty.s
om.yale.edu/an
drewmetrick/d
ata.html 
COMP Natural logarithm of sum of 
compensation (over 1 million 
for each executive) of top five 
executives. 
COMPUSTAT 
MTR_BI*
GINDEX 
Indicator for interaction effect 
between marginal tax rate 
before interest and corporate 
governance. 
COMPUSTAT 
and Website: 
http://faculty.s
om.yale.edu/an
drewmetrick/d
ata.html 
 
 
